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The moral issue of prolonging life is frequently discussed today in
the language of rights, more specifically in terms of a so-called rightto-die. Since death is generally looked upon as something evil, those
taking the rights approach find themselves in the somewhat anomalous
position of defending a right to what is considered undesirable . They
feel that they can do this reasonably because they can show that
although death may be an evil, it is not the only evil, nor even the
worst evil, and hence can conceivably be desirable, at least as a lesser
evil.
Since a substantial part of morality falls into the category of justice,
there is no inherent reason for ruling out the use of rights language; it
can apply just as validly to moral obligation as to legal obligation. But
whatever may be said for the validity of this approach, it does not
seem sufficiently basic to be satisfactory. Before one can speak in
terms of any right-to-die, he has to consider the possibility of some
obligation to life. If such an obligation exists, it would rule out, at
least to the extent that it does, any possible righ t-to-die. Actually, it
has been in terms of an obligation to preserve life that theologians
have discussed the question since the early 15th century. Since in the
present paper we are following this discussion, at least briefly, it is
from this angle that the question will be considered. At the end of the
paper, what has been said will be converted into rights language, to the
extent that this is possible.
Theologians have generally treated the duty to prolong life in the
context of violations of human life, e.g., homicide and suicide. They
have always held that respect for human life as a basic good demanded
that no one deliberately destroy innocent human life, either his own
or that of another. On this score they condemned so-called mercy
killing. Even an otherwise good motive, such as mercy, could not
justify taking innocent human life. But this was not all. Respect for
human life also implied a duty to preserve life. This would mean an
obligation at least to take ordinary food and drink as well as other
common means of preserving or prolonging life. Failure here would be
tantamount to suicide, at least if it were deliberate or due to neglect.
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But since the early 15th century, theologians have explicitly admitted
a limit to this duty to preserve life, a limit which they thought reason
itself imposed.
Before going into this question further, it might be well to distinguish it from a different, although related question - that of determining the time of death . There has been a tendency to confuse these
two issues in recent discussions. A number of cases have come to
public attention within the past few years where the basic question
was whether the person was dead or alive . This is not the issue we are
dealing with here. The assumption in the present discussion is that the
person is still alive, and the issue is the obligation to keep him alive. In
many cases where this question comes up, the fact that the person is
still alive is quite clear. But there are cases in which this is not clear, at
least initially, and in these cases confusion can arise. The problem can
be illustrated by considering a practical decision to keep such a person
on a respirator. The first question that would have to be answered is
whether the patient is dead or alive . The criterion for determining the
time of death would be operative in making this judgment. If it was
judged that the patient was dead, one could turn off the respirator
without further questioning. But if he was even probably alive, the
person responsible would have to consider a possible obligation to
prolong that life before he could turn off the respirator. The question
we are dealing with here is not whether one may turn off the respirator because the person is dead, but whether one may turn it off even
though he is still alive.
As already mentioned, theologians have always felt that man had
some obligation to preserve or prolong life. At the same time, however, they maintained that there were limits to this obligation. It was
limited, first, by the moral law itself; man could not do anything
morally wrong even presuming that this would be necessary to preserve his life. They maintained further that there were limits to the
obligation to preserve life even apart from those imposed by morality.
In other words, even if the use of a means was morally unobjectionable, while it might be used, it was not always of obligation.
Antoninus, a 15th century theologian (1389-1459), discussed the issue
indirectly in terms of an obligation to obey a doctor. 1 Since the doctor had no authority over the patient, Antoninus argued that the
patient had no obligation to obey him. He added, however, that it
might be imprudent to disobey the doctor because of his expertise.
Thus, if a sick person either knowingly or out of crass ignorance were
to eat or drink something that would bring on death, he would sin
seriously. The sin could be less serious if what he took were merely to
aggravate the illness. Although in either case it might not be a sin of
disobedience it would be a violation of the patient's obligation to
preserve his life, an obligation which the patient has apart from any
relationship with a doctor. Antoninus goes on to say, somewhat
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cryptically, that healthy people are not bound to live medicinaliter,
since to the healthy, all things are healthy . The implication seems to
be that healthy people do not have to be scrupulous about the food or
drink they take. But he adds that even a healthy person would sin if
he deliberately took something harmful to his health . Briefly, what he
seems to be saying is that while one has an obligation to preserve his
health, he should nevertheless be reasonable about it.
A successor of Antoninus, Francisco de la Vitoria (d. 1546), also
discusses the obligation to eat and drink to preserve his life. 2 Continuing what seems to have been the thought of Antoninus, he says that
one is not obliged to use foods which are the best, the most expensive
or the most exquisite. Neither is one bound to live in the healthiest
climate. By way of example, he says that if a doctor advises a patient
to eat chicken or partridge, he can eat eggs or other common dishes . 3
Such advice would not be pertinent today since the prescribed foods
are in no sense considered expensive delicacies, but it does clarify the
distinction for those times. In speaking of the obligation to take medicine, he comments that those who refuse to take some particular
medicine are not to be condemned since one can rarely be certain that
it will work. 4 Again, he is speaking of a time when little was known
about the chemical properties or effectiveness of drugs, so one would
have to modify his statement today. Vitoria himself goes on to say
that if one is certain that a drug will save his life, or that without it he
will die, he will mortally sin by not taking it . But even an effective
drug would not be obligatory if one had to continue to take it over a
long period of time.
The first author to take up the question of surgery was Domingo
Soto (1494-1560), a Dominican of the early 16th century.5 He asks
whether one is bound to undergo amputation of an arm or leg to
preserve or prolong life. His answer is that no one could force a
patient to undergo such torture. He is speaking, of course, of surgery
at a time when anesthesia was not available. Again, one would not
make the same judgment today , at least not for the same reason .
Distinction Between Ordinary/Extraordinary Means
Seventeenth century theologians formulated the obligation to preserve life and its limits in terms of a distinction between ordinary or
common means and ex traordinary m eans. 6 According to this distinction one would be obliged to use ordinary means to preserve life, but
in general would not be obliged to use extraordinary means. The
distinction was based on the burden the use of some m eans would
place on the patient (or on oth ers). If the burden was too h eavy for
the patient to carry , the means would have to be considered extraordinary, and therefore non-obligatory . The general norm for gauging
May, 1980
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the burden was the reaction of the common man, although the sensitivities of the individual were also taken into account. Thus, theologians admitted that the fear or embarrassment of some women of an
examination by a male doctor might make such an examination an
extraordinary means. If a female doctor were available, an examination would generally be considered ordinary means. In assessing any
particular means, it made no difference whether the burden to the
patient was experienced before, during or after the treatment. The
need for extensive travel, for instance, could make a treatment extraordinary even before use. In the amputation case discussed by Soto,
the burden was experienced during the procedure. It could happen,
however, that the burden would not be experienced until after the use
of the means. In today's society, for example, a quadruple amputation
might not be the painful experience it was in the 16th century, but it
could certainly make life burdensome for its victim afterwards ; this in
itself would make it an extraordinary procedure. So if a particular
means imposed a great burden on the patient either before, during or
after its use, it would not be obligatory. The burden could take the
form of great pain, physical or mental hardship, danger or even
expense.
Some today are a little reluctant to accept great expense as an
excusing reason for omitting some treatment. To them it is somewhat
venal to attach more value to money than to health . There is something to be said for this attitude, but one must remember that what is
sacrificed is usually not just money, but other things that money
could buy - things that might be just as valuable as health . Or one
might be incurring crippling debts that could make life very difficult.
It is essential to point out at this time that the distinction between
ordinary and extraordinary means as used by the theologian does not
mean at all the same thing it means as when used by a physician. To
the physician ordinary means are routine means; whatever procedure
is customary or usual in a particular case is considered ordinary. It is
the relation of the means to medical practice that makes it ordinary; it
has nothing to do with the burden imposed on the patient. It might
well be that the two concepts would coincide, so that a treatment that
was routine from the medical viewpoint would be ordinary from the
moral standpoint, at least in the sense that it was easily available. But
they are in no way coextensive. A procedure that might be considered
ordinary or routine medically speaking could be very extraordinary
from the viewpoint of the burden it places on the patient. An example
of this might be the treatment for kidney failure called hemodialysis.
The medical profession would consider this ordinary treatment for
kidney shutdown. But if the kidneys were shut down permanently ,
hemodialysis could easily become very burdensome to the patient,
particularly an elderly patient. In a counseling situation, one might
urge a patient to put up with the burden for the benefit of prolonging
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life. But one could not impose a moral duty on a patient to carry such
a heavy burden. The basis of the moral distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means reinforces the reason why the option belongs
to the patient rather than the doctor. Only the patient can gauge the
burden he experiences. The doctor may be in the best position to
judge what is "ordinary" treatment from the medical viewpoint, but
he is not the best qualified to judge the burden to the patient, which is
the decisive factor in the moral distinction.
Use of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means
was not limited to terminal cases. Even if the use of a particular means
would prolong life indefinitely (e.g., amputation, hemodialysis), if it
imposed too much of a burden on the patient, it would not be considered obligatory. So the decisive factor was not benefit to the
patient, but the burden involved. Theologians, however, did use
another distinction in dealing with the duty to preserve life and placed
a limitation on the obligation to use even ordinary means. This distinction centered around the benefit to the patient, that is, whether the
means was helpful or useless . The norm was an obvious one: no one
can be obliged to employ useless means. The general principle is
broader than the problem of prolonging life, but these theologians
were applying it only to this context. Judging from the examples they
gave, one can also conclude that they were speaking of cases where
people were dying. If a person were going to die in the immediate
future and there was no real hope that the uses of a particular means
would prolong his life except, perhaps, minimally, it would be considered useless, and therefore not obligatory, even if it were otherwise
ordinary. A 17th century theologian illustrated this point by the
example of one being burned at the stake. 7 If water was easily available, but not enough to put out the fire, the victim would not be
obliged to use it. Death was imminent whether he used it or not, so it
would offer no real benefit; it would merely prolong the agony of
dying. Another case offered by way of example was that of a person
starving to death who had only one meal available. Since one meal
would not make an appreciable difference in delaying death, it could
not be consid~red obligatory m eans. This limitation of the obligation
to use ordinary means is especially important in terminal cases, where
death is imminent whether they are used or not.
Many theologians today classify means that offer no appreciable
benefit in prolonging life as extraordinary, subsuming the distinction
between useful /useless means under the definition of ordinary /extraordinary means. In more recent times, this has caused some confusion.
My own preference is to teep them separate, and I have already hinted
at the reason for this. They deal with different issues - burden and
benefit - and usually apply to different types of cases . In practice, at
least, the question of benefit seems limited largely to terminal cases;
burden can be an issue even in cases which are not terminal.
May, 1980
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Whether medical procedures will be classified as ordinary or extraordinary by the theologian will vary according to time and place. As
already mentioned, simple amputations were considered extraordinary
means because of the pain involved. Where anesthesia is available,
however, surgery would not be considered extraordinary, at least by
reason of the pain suffered. Similarly, such procedures as giving
oxygen, IV feeding, blood transfusions, might have been considered
extraordinary means 50 or a hundred years ago. Today they could
hardly be considered such, except perhaps in some part of the globe
where they are not easily available. Similarly, although procedures of
this kind would not be classified as extraordinary on a short term
basis, e.g., to pull a patient through a crisis, if they had to become a
way of life, even today they would fall into this class. e.g., long term
or permanent use of an artificial respirator. The burden of such use
could make them intolerable.
It might be well to point out at this juncture that the traditional
approach to the moral obligation to prolong life allows broader
options than recent legislation in California, and some proposed legislation in other states, would permit. The California statute, for
instance, legalizes the option not to use "extraordinary" means only
in terminal cases. 8 Converting this into the language we have been
using, one would say that the legislation covers primarily those means
which would not make any appreciable difference in prolonging life,
since death is imminent whether the means are used or not. It does
not cover those cases where the use of the means would prolong the
life of the patient indefinitely, but would put too much of a burden
on the patient to make them obligatory. It would not cover, for
instance, the Quinlan case. Even if the girl had made the "living will"
called for in the statute, it would have had no force in her case since it
was never considered terminal. And even in a terminal case, the legislation makes no allowance for a proxy decision where the patient is
comatose but has made no "living will." It would indeed be unfortunate if such legislation prejudiced rather than protected the moral
right uf a patient either to forego the use of extraordinary means or to
discontinue them.
Basic Duty Belongs to Person
The basic duty to preserve or prolong life belongs to the person
himself. The same is true of the option to use extraordinary means. It
is up to the person himself to use or forego the use of such means.
This offers no problem when an individual is on his own, but if h e is in
a patient-doctor relationship, a conflict can arise. The doctor may
want to use means that go beyond both the obligation and the wishes
of the patient. Even in this relationship the decision belongs to and
remains with the patient. The doctor has only those rights over the
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patient which the patient gives him. If the patient, therefore, decides
not to use extraordinary means, the doctor has no right to impose
them on him, and if he does, he is violating the rights of the patient. 9
Once the principle has been set down, it must be admitted that it is
not always easy to determine the real wishes of the patient, especially
in difficult cases. This is very clearly illustrated in a case described
recently in the Hastings Center Report. 10 The patient involved, a
young man, suffered second and third degree burns over most of his
body. Both eyes were blinded by corneal damage, his ears were mostly
destroyed, and he suffered severe burns to his face, upper extremities,
body and legs. The patient constantly and consistently resisted the
very painful treatment h e had to undergo, and pleaded with the doctors to let him die. But despite his repeated protests, the doctors
continued to treat him for many months. Eventually, however, they
gave in to his pleas and agreed that if he did not want any further
treatment they would not force it on him. When that happened, the
young man withdrew his resistance and agreed to go along with the
treatment. One would have to conclude that in this case it would have
been a mistake for the doctors to have accepted his original plea
literally. The ultimate outcome seemed to indicate that all the young
man wanted was a voice in his own treatment. Once this was granted,
he was satisfied. He really did not want to die. The case illustrates very
poignantly the difficulty of interpreting the requests of a person who
is in great pain . It seems obvious that mistakes cannot be entirely
eliminated in interpreting the patient 's real wishes in these cases. The
most one can hope for is to keep them to a minimum . What is essential for doctors is to keep in mind that the decision to use or forego
extraordinary means is not their own decision. It must always be a
justifiable interpretation of the real wishes of the patient.
If the patient is comatose or incompetent, it is up to a responsible
relative to make the decision for him . This may be the only way a
patient can exercise his right either to ask for extraordinary means or
to forego them. The obligation of the proxy, then, is to make the
decision the patient would make if he were able. If he has no way of
knowing this; his best option is to make the decision he would make if
he were in the patient's place, or the decision that reasonable people
would make for themselves in that situation. Mistakes may be made,
but this procedure should keep them to a minimum. What must be
kept in mind is that the proxy does not have the freedom the patient
himself has regarding extraordinary means . His obligation is not based
on the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means . but on
the wishes of the patient. If he were to decide against extraordinary
means in a situation where the patient would want them, he is doing
wrong. Too often in recent times ethicians have assumed that the
proxy has the same freedom the patient himself has to forego extraordinary means.
May, 1980
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It is one thing to discuss the obligation to use means to preserve life
of a patient; it is quite another to discuss the obligation of others to
provide such means to a patient. Again, recent writing on this subject
has oversimplified this obligation by reducing it to the distinction
between providing ordinary and extraordinary means. The impression
is left that the obligation to provide means, like the obligation to use
means, depends on the nature of the means : if the means are ordinary,
there is an obligation to provide them; if they are extraordinary, there
is no obligation. The obligation to provide means is much more
nuanced than that. The nature of this obligation will differ according
to the relation of the person providing the means to the patient. If
that person is the patient's doctor, he will have an obligation in justice
to supply whatever means the patient reasonably requests. Because of
their special relationship, parents will also have a special obligation to
provide for the needs of their children. Others will have an obligation
in charity to provide m eans to preserve life if the patient is in need of
t heir help. Although these obligations are graded according to the
relationship with the patient, none of them are absolute. In determining the limits of the obligation, another factor must be taken into
consideration: the hardship to the donor or provider. No one, for
instance, would be obliged to sacrifice his life to supply a patient's
need. If someone were drowning and an attempt to save him would
involve serious risk to my own life, while it might be a heroic thing
to do, I would not be obliged to risk my life to save him . This would
be true even of providing ordinary means. I would not be obliged to
give food necessary to preserve my own life to a starving man,
although food is generally classified as ordinary m eans. On the other
hand, if a patient wishes extraordinary means , and cannot supply
them otherwise, even a stranger might have an obligation to provide
them if he could easily do so without serious inconvenience. And the
obligation of the doctor or parent would be even more binding. So the
obligation to provide means necessary to preserve life cannot be
reduced to the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means.
It is determined by the wishes of the patient in need and my ability to
relieve that need without serious hardship.

Obligation to Help
It should be noted at this time that the obligation to help another,
whether of the doctor or the parent, or even of a stranger, goes
beyond merely providing means to preserve life. A patient may have
other needs, and these may continue to call for help even when the
obligation to preserve life ceases. Paul Ramsey calls attentio n to this
fact when he speaks of the obligation of "only caring " for the
dying. 11 The only criticism I would have of his treatment is that one
easily gets the impression from it that this latter obligation begins

158

Linacre Quarterly

when the obligation to preserve life ceases. Actually, the obligation to
help others in need is a general obligation that extends through life. A
person may have many other needs throughout his lifetime for which he
himself cannot provide. The obligation of charity extends to any need
the person himself cannot relieve. It continues even after the obligation
to preserve life and the need for assistance in this regard has ceased. One
does not simply wheel a patient, at either end of life, into a corner and
leave him there because it has been decided that the obligation to
preserve his or her life has ceased. As long as he is alive (and even
after), the obligation of charity will continue to call for relief of
whatever other needs he or she may still have.
An equally important question is whether the obligation to provide
means to preserve the life of another will cease apart from the presence of serious hardship to the provider. The assumption is that ordinary means are needed or extraordinary means have been requested
either by the patient or his proxy. Could a person who was easily able
to provide such means legitimately refuse to do so? There are
instances in which this would clearly be wrong. For example, if a man
were drowning and I could easily save him, it would be wrong to refuse
help because he was black. But what if he were seriously defective or
handicapped? I do not think that a decision not to save the seriously
defective person would necessarily involve discrimination. Thus, if one
had to make a choice between saving a healthy child and a defective
one, I think a legitimate choice could be made of the healthy child,
unless the lifesaver was the parent (or the doctor) of the defective
child. It should be remarked, however, that there seems to be considerable agreement that in general when not all can be saved, a random
selection is the most just. If the decision had to do only with saving or
not saving the defective child, I suspect that most people would feel
very guilty about letting a defective child drown when they could
easily save him. But when there is a question of letting a defective
child die in a hospital, although the reality of refusing help is the
same, it does not appear as stark, since death is not immediate.
As there is no evidence to show that defective people put an end to
their lives mor.e frequently than normal people, there is no reason for
thinking that they consider death preferable to continued existence
with their handicap .12 If this is true, it is hard to understand how
refusing help on the basis of quality-of-life estimate is generally consistent with the duty of charity; it would be dooming many handicapped people to what they would consider a lesser good . There may
be a rare case where predictable quality-of-life would be so low that
the life itself could not be classified as human, but this would be a rare
exception and the prediction would be extremely difficult to make.
Charity, moreover, would demand that the benefit of any doubt be
given the defective person.
It would be impossible in this paper to go into all the nuances of
May, 1980
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the obligation to provide help to people in dying situations. The purpose here has been chiefly to introduce the distinctions that should be
made between the obligation of a person faced with a decision about
prolonging life, the obligation of a proxy who has to make a decision
for an incompetent, and that of a person whose help is needed to save
another person's life. These are all related obligations, but they are
also different. It is the judgment of the present writer that in recent
writing they have been bunched together without adequate distinction. Each obligation has its own norms, and although they are related
to the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, they
cannot simply be reduced to it.
One hears rumblings today against the distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means. Robert Veatch wants to substitute the term
" reasonable" in discussing the obligation to preserve life; one would
not be obliged to use means if it were reasonable (to the patient, if he
were competent, or to a reasonable man, if the patient were not competent) to refuse them. 13 Since his reasonable / unreasonable distinction
involves both the notion of usefulness and that of burden discussed
above, he is not really departing very far from the traditional principles set down above. It is only the terminology that he would like to
change. I am not sure that the change accomplishes any great clarification. but I would have no objection to it as long as one does not
conclude from the fact that it would be reasonable to turn down a
particular means that it would be unreasonable to use . This might be
true of a useless means, but not necessarily of a means t hat was
burdensome. If the patient wishes to accept the burden, it would be
perfectly reasonable to use such means. This moral option should not
be taken from him or frowned on as unreasonable.
Ramsey Considers Distinction Outdated
Paul Ramsey would also like to bury the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. 14 He considers the distinction not only
outdated but actually harmful. His chief grievance seems to be with
the use of the distinction in the case of the non-dying incompetent
patient. It is his contention that the distinction brings in a quality-oflife dimension that should not be a consideration in these cases. 15
Ramsey himself substitutes, at least in the case of the inco mp etent
patient, a medical indications norm. According to this norm, if a
treatment is medically indicated, it is obligatory; if it is not, it would
not be obligatory. Thus, if the patient were terminal, and treatment
would be useless, it would not be m edical ly indicated and h e nce not
obligatory. If the patient were not dying, and the treatment were not
medically indicated because it would not help and might even h arm
the patient, it would not be obligatory. If it were medically indicated
because it would help the patient, it would be obligatory. The virtue
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of this position is that it puts the emphasis on the effectiveness of the
means rather than on the quality of the patient's life. 16
There is much to be said in favor of this approach. This is dramatically illustrated in Ramsey's own book by the examples he offers of
abuse of the quality-of-life norm. But it has this drawback. The traditional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means was
meant to show that other considerations could outweigh medical indications in dealing with the duty to prolong life. More precisely, the
burden of using certain means to prolong life could be such that one
could not reasonably make them obligatory . It is true that in the past
theologians were speaking of decisions made by competents. But is it
reasonable to make incompetent people bear burdens that competent
people do not have to bear? Certainly, the decision is more difficult to
make in the case of incompetents, but the difficulty does not warrant
retreat to a position which seems to compromise the rights of the
incompetent. Ramsey seems to be canonizing medical indications, at
least in the case of incompetents. I would tend to agree with him in
his concern about the dangers of quality-of-life considerations, but I
do not agree that in order to avoid them we should or have to make
medical decisions final.
From what has been said earlier in the paper, it should be clear that
I agree with Ramsey's position that the norm for a proxy decision is
not the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, but
the wishes of the patient. In the case of infants, of course, it is impossible to know these wishes, but even in these cases one cannot simply
fall back on this distinction, and forego extraordinary means. I have
no hard statistics, but I think it can be said that competent people
choose to use extraordinary means far more frequently than they
forego them. If one cannot know the wishes of an incompetent, he
may be able at least to approximate them by trying to discern what
competent people would decide if they were in such circumstances.
What I am trying to say is that the rights of an incompetent person
should be respected as much as those of the competent. He should
have the same right to bear a burden or to forego one, and it should
not simply be assumed that because he is incompetent, especially if he
is defective, only ordinary means are in order.
Some attention must be given to another dimension of this problem: the duty of the doctor to his profession. Does this demand that
he continue to fight disease with all means available? Is he not failing
in his duty if he foregoes the use of some means, even with the
consent of the patient? If the doctor were fighting disease in a testtube, or perhaps even in an experimental animal, there would be no
limit to what he could do, except for the dimensions of his own
resources. But the doctor who is fighting disease in a human patient
must respect that person and his legitimate wishes. His professional
position gives him no right to override the wishes of the patient. The
May, 1980
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medical profession is for the good of the patient; the patient is not the
tool of the profession. A doctor who would, out of his duty to his
profession, impose the use of extraordinary means on the patient
against his legitimate wishes would be subordinating his patient to the
profession, and to that extent, abusing him.
It is quite conceivable that a conscience conflict would arise
between doctor and patient regarding the use of some treatment or
therapy. If the doctor cannot persuade the patient to accept the treatment which his conscience demands he give him, his only alternative is
to bow out of the case. This will allow the patient to employ the
services of a doctor whose conscience is not at odds with the wishes of
the patient. Unfortunately, this is more easily said than done, especially if the patient is in a hospital and a proxy decision is made by
close relatives. It is well known that an impasse of this kind was
reached in the recent Quinlan case, which subsequently had to be
taken to the courts for settlement. There may have been no alternative
to a court solution in the Quinlan case, but it is certainly regrettable
to have to go to the courts to settle a conscience problem. Perhaps it
might have been unnecessary if the conscience problem had not been
complicated by fear of a malpractice or even a criminal charge.
Decision Often Left to Doctor
Even though the option belongs to the patient, it must be admitted
that patients will often leave the decision to use extraordinary means
up to the doctor. Since the decision frequently involves medical judgment and the doctor knows more about medicine than the patient, the
latter will often confide in his judgment. Also, even when the patient
makes the decision himself, what he decides will often depend on how
the doctor presents the case to him. What is the obligation of the
doctor in these cases? Even here it seems clear that the interests of the
patient rather than those of the profession would dictate the judgment
or decision of the doctor. In the therapeutic relationship, the first
duty of the doctor, even as a professional man, is to the patient and
his wishes. If he gives priority to professional interests, he is really
making the patient a research subject, and without the patient's
explicit consent, would be abusing him to that extent.
One sometimes hears the charge that the doctor (or the patient)
who foregoes extraordinary measures is "playing God." God is the
Author of life and death, and the decision to terminate life should be
left to Him. In responding to this charge, one cannot of course deny
that God is the author of life and death, but this does not imply that
man must use all possible means to postpone death. As a matter of
fact, he would seem to be more open to the accusation of usurping a
divine prerogative by prolonging life than by not prolonging it. So one
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cannot conclude from God's authorship of life that it would be wrong
to forego extraordinary means (much less useless means). This would
be wrong only if man knew his appointed time and then anticipated it.
No one can claim such knowledge .
In a similar vein some will argue that since a miracle is always
possible, a doctor must continue to use all means to keep a patient
alive. It is hard to see how one could establish a duty on the part of a
doctor to gear his practice to the possibility of a miracle. In fact, it is
not even clear how he would or could do this. Presumably, God can
work a miracle anytime He wants. And He is just as capable of bringing a person back from death as He is of bringing him back from a
terminal illness. Keeping a person alive can hardly be a necessary
condition for a miracle. So it is not clear how the possibility of a
miracle provides any argument for an obligation to use extraordinary
means.
In the present controversy over prolonging life, some have claimed
that once extraordinary means have been initiated, there is an obligation to continue them. They have argued, for instance, that although
there may have been no duty initially to put a patient on a respirator,
once this has been done, there is a duty to continue its use. There is
really no justification for this stand. If means are truly extraordinary,
there is no more obligation to continue them than there was to initiate
them. One does not create an obligation by the mere fact of initiating
extraordinary means. Actually, even in a case where the means were
judged ordinary when initiated, any obligation to continue them
would cease if for some reason they became extraordinary. There is
even less reason for obligatory continuation of means which were
extraordinary from the beginning.
At least partially connected with the above problem are the misgivings of some about terminating the use of extraordinary means by
acts of commission rather than omission. There are those who have no
difficulty about acts of omission but who see in acts of commission,
euthanasia or mercy killing. While they would not scruple about not
putting a patient on a respirator, they tend to identify " pulling the
plug" with direct killing. Their problem is really more psychological
than moral. Not all positive acts taken by physicians involve the taking
of human life; they do so only if they actually cause the patient's
death. There is an important difference between injecting an air
bubble in a patient's bloodstream and turning off a respirator. The air
bubble really causes the person's death. If the respirator is turned off,
the cause of the patient's death is the very cause that would have
brought it on if the respirator had never been used. If the use of the
respirator had to be considered an ordinary means of preserving life,
turning it off woulcl still be wrong, but granted that it is an extraordinary means, turning it off in no way involves either direct killing
or culpable neglect.
May, 1980

163

We are in a position now to convert what we have been saying into
the so-called language of rights. But I would have to preface what I
have to say with the protest that I do not like the expression right-todie. It says much more than I want to say or think should be said, and
so is misleading. In other words, I think that it has legitimate meaning
only within very prescribed limits. No one has a right-to-die in the
sense that he may take his own life or authorize someone else to do
the same, much less impose on him a corresponding obligation. If
there were a positive right-to-die it would imply all this. I doubt that
anyone holds a right-to-die in this sense. Nor does one have a right-todie in the sense that he may omit the use of ordinary means to preserve life, or authorize (or even oblige) someone else to withhold such
means. In other words, active euthanasia has never been acceptable,
and the same is true of passive euthanasia, at least in the sense that the
latter would allow the omission of ordinary means. The only right a
patient has - and this is a real right - is not to use extraordinary
means to prolong life, and a consequent right not to be forced to use
such means . This implies a corresponding obligation on others not to
force such means on him . Within these limits, and only within them,
does the right-to-die have meaning.
In concluding this article, I should explain that the intention here
was to present and explain the traditional position on the obligation
to prolong life and its limits. It was felt that there was need of such a
presentation because of the many misinterpretations and misunderstandings current about this position . There was no intention of presenting newer positions as such but only insofar as they implied a
misunderstanding of the traditional position. The article, as a consequence, has its built-in limitations. It was not meant to be a catalog or
critique of recent opinions on the duty to prolong life. These opinions
may make for interesting debate, but it was not the purpose of this
article to contribute to this debate. The purpose here was simply to
show that the traditional position , if properly understood, is still a
viable one.
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